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Proponents of social capital have argued that individuals bound 
together in dense social networks, infused with norms of reciprocity and 
trust, are better able and more inclined to act collectively for mutual 
benefit and social purposes as opposed to atomised individuals. This is 
due to the fact that the existence of social capital enables groups and 
individuals to deal smoothly and efficiently with various economic and 
social issues. Social capital is therefore seen as “sociological 
superglue” that holds society together. The social capital thesis, 
however, is based on studies done mainly in mature Western 
democracies where ethnic and racial cleavages do not figure 
prominently in the social structure. Questions such as what are the 
necessary requisites for social capital to flourish in a society that is 
divided along racial, ethnic, and religious lines and what are its 
repercussions (the existence or absence of social capital) have not been 
adequately addressed. Does the existence of social capital in such 
society have a moderating effect or will it polarise the society further?  
There is no doubt that norms of reciprocity and trust exist in all societies 
but do individuals in a highly polarised society trust other individuals 
from different ethnic or religious groups? In a modest attempt to address 
these issues, this article looks at the role of the state in generating social 
capital  across racial, ethnic, and religious lines at the grass-roots level 
in the northern state of Penang, Malaysia. We argue that the creation of 
a “semi-autonomous” community organisations or a “state-induced 
social capital” plays a crucial role in fostering face-to-face interaction 
among individuals of different ethnic and religious lines in an otherwise 
a highly polarised society. This line of argument calls into question the Azeem Fazwan Ahmad Farouk & Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar 
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social capital thesis which takes the existence of social capital as a 
given and cannot be generated by institutional conditions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Sociologists have long speculated the basis of social bonds, and 
provided insights into the foundation that held society together. Aristotle 
has argued, for example, that it is human nature to band together, and 
associations have thus existed in all societies. Nevertheless, kinship, real 
or imaginary, has been the foundation of these associations as human 
beings feel at ease socialising with others that share the same cultural or 
biological characteristics. Nations and nationalism in the Western 
context can be said to be born out of the yearning for the creation of a 
geographical unit composing of individuals that share the same cultural 
or biological attributes (real or imaginary). Multi-ethnic societies 
therefore faced an uphill task of creating a national identity that 
supersedes primordial ties. This situation is prevalent in post-colonial 
societies where arbitrary boundary lines were carved out by Western 
imperial powers. These so called nations are often faced with instability 
due to ethnic warfare because invocations of “We the people” can lead 
to ideas of “organic democracy”, in which the People are defined as a 
unitary bloc in terms of opposition to an “other”, which comprises 
minorities of an ethnic or racial or political kind.     
 
The list of nations beset by ethnic cleavages is long, and a common 
thread that lumps these countries together is the uphill task of promoting 
goodwill and understanding between the different ethnic groups. 
Malaysia stands out as a fairly successful middle income, multi-ethnic 
country where different ethnic groups have co-existed quite peacefully 
for the past fifty years since its independence. While one may argue that 
ethnic peace in Malaysia is fragile, and that sensitive issues can easily 
spark an ethnic strife, Malaysia can still be used as a model for a country 
that has effectively managed its ethnic relations. Having said that, there 
is no doubt that Malaysians are still divided along ethnic and religious 
lines but incidences of outward hostility between the different ethnic 
groups have been on the decline. Whether ethnic peace in Malaysia is 
largely maintained by the existence of a set of coercive laws is debatable State-Induced Social Capital and Ethnic Integration 
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and will not be addressed here. While we agree that the Malaysian 
regime is “semi-democratic”, and that consociationalism as practiced in 
Malaysia is flawed, we still maintain that the Malaysian state has been 
active in promoting inter-ethnic harmony.  
 
The mainstream studies on social capital stress the importance of face-
to-face interaction in generating the stock of social capital, this claim, 
we argue, is applicable in a homogenous society where ethnic and 
religious cleavages are not salient. In this era of globalisation and 
devolution, it is also fashionable to argue that the state should take a 
backseat, and let the private sector or the civil society take the lead in 
building communities. However, a less commonly asked but no less 
important question is this: What can the state do to encourage 
community building in an otherwise highly polarised society? This 
article explores this question, arguing that the Malaysian state promotes 
bridging (inclusive) social capital
1 by encouraging the formation of 
“semi-autonomous” community organisations that encourage face-to-
face interaction among people across diverse social cleavages. In other 
words, we are bringing the state back in by stressing the fact that it can 
play a role in generating “bridging” social capital.  
  
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ASSOCIATIONAL LIVE  
 
The eminent political scientists Robert Putnam (1993) and Francis 
Fukuyama (1995) argue that social capital is, by and large, the product 
of cultural and historical legacies. Compared to persons or communities 
not  well endowed with social capital, the existence of an ample stock of 
social capital within a community, region or even a nation can contribute 
to effective governance and multiple social and economic issues. 
Development, democracy as well as community peace, it is claimed, 
stand to benefit in situations of high level of social capital. Putnam and 
Leonardi (1993), for example, trace social capital to medieval Italy, 
explaining how, in the south, Norman mercenaries built a powerful 
feudal monarchy with hierarchical structures, whereas in the north 
                                                 
1    Bridging social capital is inclusive and can not only generate broader 
identities and reciprocity but also reach out to unlike people in dissimilar 
situations. In addition, bridging social capital is outward looking and 
encompasses people across diverse social cleavages (Field, 2003: 42). Azeem Fazwan Ahmad Farouk & Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar 
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communal republics based on horizontal relationships fostered mutual 
assistance and economic cooperation. Putnam seeks to demonstrate that 
the “civicness” of the north survived natural catastrophes and political 
changes. In addition, he points out the civic regions were not wealthier 
to in the first place. These conclusions are well accepted by multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development 
(OECD), and therefore have tremendous policy implications. The 
repercussions of this view have left many social scientists and policy 
makers dissatisfied. If the amount of social capital in a society is so 
strongly path dependent, then there would seem to be very few policy 
options available to stimulate the development of social capital. It is 
more likely that governments, and particularly oppressive regimes, can 
damage and destroy social capital, as the examples of the Norman 
kingdom in southern Italy and of several authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes in southern and eastern Europe show. The most pessimistic 
view would be that societies that are low on social capital are simply 
stuck in a quagmire of distrust, and there seems to be little that can be 
done about it. However, in his later work Putnam makes clear that we 
need to make a distinction between short-term and long-term 
institutional influences on social capital. It might be true that generalised 
trust as well as forms and density of social interactions are shaped 
through historical forces, but present day social and political institutions 
and local, regional and national governments are also able to make an 
impact.  
 
Putnam and neo-Tocquevillean scholars who privileged using data sets 
such as the General Social Surveys have relied on the existence of 
voluntary associations, in any societal context (mostly Western), as an 
indicator of the level social capital; in particular, they see participation 
in the organisations of civil society as producing the patterns of 
individual behaviour and social interaction necessary for healthy 
democratic governance. According to scholars from this persuasion, 
associations function as “learning schools for democracy” (Putnam & 
Leonardi, 1993). The claim is that in areas with stronger, dense, 
horizontal, and more cross-cutting networks, there is a spillover from 
membership in organisations to the cooperative values and norms that 
citizens develop. In areas where networks with such characteristics do 
not develop, there are fewer opportunities to learn civic virtues and 
democratic attitudes, resulting in a lack of trust. In this account, social State-Induced Social Capital and Ethnic Integration 
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capital is seen as important because it benefits the functioning of 
democratic institutions. At the micro-level, this entails the relationship 
between an individual’s membership in associations and networks, and 
an individual’s values and attitudes. These norms and values, in turn, 
help resolve dilemmas of collective action and smooth economic and 
political negotiations (Coleman, 1988). In addition, associations broaden 
the participants’ sense of self, developing the “I” into the “We” (Putnam, 
1995: 67). They thus foster what Tocqueville termed “self-interest 
properly understood,” as well as a wider sense of community and social 
purpose.  
 
While the neo-Tocquevilleans might have it right in positing a positive 
relationship between membership in associations and its attendant 
effects for democracy, the critical flaw emanating from this 
understanding is that all associations are looked upon as having the same 
decisive consequences for democratic consolidation. So far the social 
capital school has mainly used membership in associations or other 
types of networks as the indicator of social capital, assuming that such 
groups and associations function as a school for democracy in which 
cooperative values and trust are easily socialised. It is generally taken as 
a given that associational life generates trust. In other words, we do not 
have empirical proof of this function, more so in highly polarised 
societies. As Paxton (2002) has rightly noted, different associations need 
not have equivalent effects on democracy. Some associations might even 
be detrimental to democracy and can exacerbate existing social 
cleavages. For example, ethic based associations could reduce the levels 
of tolerance and thereby undermining democracy. More importantly, 
neo-Tocquevillean scholars fail to recognise that civil society can often 
serve to weaken rather than strengthen a democratic regime. Because 
they are unable to differentiate between the positive and negative 
consequences of a vibrant associational life, neo-Tocquevilleans are 
unable to predict or account for situations where civil society produces 
inauspicious patterns of individual behaviour and social interaction. As 
such, a significant question about the relationship between associations 
and democracy remains unanswered.  
 
Since neo-Tocquevilleans have stressed that involvement in associations 
generates social capital, the nature of social relations, and the cultural 
traits of a given community are among the factors, which play important 
roles in determining the likelihood that, at the micro-level, individuals Azeem Fazwan Ahmad Farouk & Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar 
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would look upon civil society organisations to pursue specific interest. 
In the Southeast Asian context for instance, the immigrant communities 
have displayed greater proclivity in forming voluntary associations. As 
for the indigenous socio-cultural system, it is more typical of loosely-
structured and village centered pattern. Hsu (1963) supports this 
contention by positing that predominant forms of secondary social 
structure express basic cultural principles. Indian (Hindu), Chinese, and 
American cultural communities thus have their philosophical biases of 
hierarchy, kinship, and contract, respectively, manifested in caste, clan, 
and club organisations. If this observation is correct, plural societies will 
exhibit differentiation in the levels of social capital in that the cultural 
traditions of one ethnic group could very well be compatible with 
associational life as opposed to that of another. It follows that an ethnic 
group that is well-endowed with social capital could be well off 
economically, and is more likely to cooperate in achieving common 
goals. On the other hand, an ethnic group that has a low level of social 
capital is more likely to be poor, suffer from endemic corruption and 
ineffective public administration, and has weak and inefficient business 
sector. When both groups co-exist within the same political boundary, 
the differentiation in inter-ethnic levels of social capital could lead to a 
high degree of mistrust between the diverse ethnic groups. This, in its 
turn, will reverse the causal flow of social capital: Inequality in the 
levels of social capital between different groups could well lead to 
instability. Lin (2001), for example, has noted that inequality of social 
capital occurs when a certain group clusters at relatively disadvantaged 
socioeconomic positions, and the general tendency is for individuals to 
associate with those of similar group or socioeconomic characteristics. 
Depending on the process of historical and institutional constructions, 
each society structurally has provided unequal opportunities to members 
of different groups defined over race, gender, religion, caste, or other 
ascribed or constructed characteristics (Lin, 2001:  787).  The inability 
of social capitalists to explain the types of voluntary organisations that 
are compatible with democracy and how associations of the “bonding” 
kind might have adverse effects in a plural society continue to cloud our 
understanding of how inequality in social capital might have an adverse 
affect in the well being of the community as a whole. If social capital 
can bring out peace, democratic consolidation, and economic 
advancement then the lack of social capital or differentiation in the 
levels of social capital could possibly lead to instability, 
authoritarianism, and economic regression.  State-Induced Social Capital and Ethnic Integration 
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THE STATE AS A SOURCE OF “BRIDGING SOCIAL 
CAPITAL” 
 
According to social capitalists, one important method through which 
trust, and hence social capital, can be increased is via participation in 
voluntary social organisations. As we have mentioned at the outset, it is 
often taken as a given that associations, no matter what the basis for its 
existence, will overcome the collective action problem. Social capitalists 
have also overlooked the fact that in a highly polarised society, 
associations of the “bonding” kind are the norm. Putnam (2000) has 
pointed out that bonding social capital is “inward looking and tend to 
reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups” (Putnam 2000: 
22). It also follows that in a highly polarised society, ethnic differences 
are often reinforced by class divisions, and more often than not, 
associational life will tend to generate social capital of the bonding kind. 
This is due to the fact that the general tendency is for individuals to 
associate with those of similar group or socioeconomic characteristics. 
In addition, scholars such Lin (2001) and Portes (1998) have advanced 
the enclave-economy hypothesis arguing that ethnic economic enclaves 
afford opportunities for entrepreneurs and labourers to gain a foothold in 
the economy. Even though this observation has been challenged, the 
basic premise that such a market is largely built on kin and ethnic 
networks has been generally acknowledged.  
 
In a plural society, we can expect that vertically divided groups will tend 
to take on political significance when some social groups develop clear 
perceptions of the differences and conflicts between themselves and 
other social groups. Herein lies the role of the state. While the state can 
either accentuate or moderate ethnic conflict by opting for policies that 
can either aggravate social cleavages or promote inter-ethnic harmony, 
we will, for the purpose of this study, assume that the state is “benign”.  
Totalitarian states, for example, will attempt to atomise society so that 
people become isolated and mistrustful of one another and hence unable 
to concert their efforts in organised political activity (Kornhauser, 1959). 
In other words, the state has the ability either to create or destroy social 
capital. Since we are working on the assumption that the state is 
“benign”, we will attempt to construct a model that will explain the 
central argument of this article: Provision of a rule-governed 
environment in which the state promotes national integration and social 
organisation to take place appears to be the most basic way in which to Azeem Fazwan Ahmad Farouk & Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar 
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generate “bridging social capital” in an otherwise a highly distrustful 
society.  
 
As Figure 1 indicates, the state can realise its capacity to generate trust 
among citizens by encouraging face-to-face interaction between people 
of diverse backgrounds. This could be accomplished by establishing an 
outfit at the local level that supports integration and participation of 
citizens. The mobilisation of state resources and institutional 
approaches, in its turn, can inspire societal responses. More specifically, 
the state can encourage cross-cultural activities in order to foster social 
relationships that can generate “bridging social capital” as it has the 
ability not only to foster capacity building but also make trust possible 
by establishing contacts among otherwise highly distrustful groups. This 
model stresses the importance of structures and state institutions in 
providing channels and incentives for people in dissimilar situations, 
such as those who are entirely from a different ethnic group, thus 
enabling people from diverse backgrounds to interact with one another.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Role of the State in Generating Bridging Social Capital. 
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Where states have provided the necessary infrastructure for untrusting 
citizens to associate freely, face-to-face interaction among groups of 
diverse backgrounds is likely to occur. Put differently, the design of 
public institutions can either impede or facilitate the levels of “bridging 
social capital”. This model also problematises the question of the 
generation of social capital as a by product of the incentives deriving 
from social structures and state institutions. While Putnam (2000) 
considers social capital as exogenous and path dependent, we argue that 
the generation of social capital, especially of the “bridging” kind is 
endogenous and dependent. This is due to the fact that in a highly 
polarised society, the spread of generalised trust, and norms of 
reciprocity and social participation are complex phenomena, and cannot 
be explained by involvement in civil society per se. Whereas the concept 
of social capital has traditionally been located in the realm of civil 
society, we are suggesting that it should be broaden to include various 
types of social interaction – this model is postulating that “bridging” 
social capital is deeply embedded in the triangular relationship among 
the state, the family, and civil society. The important aspects of civil 
society that have been highlighted by the rise of social capital concept, 
such as generalised trust, social interactions, civic engagement, 
cooperation, tolerance, are all closely related and not separated from 
state institutions and family life. In other words, civil society 
organisations which are organised along group and class lines rather 
than across them, particularly in a multicultural society, can be 
destructive to inter-ethnic relations, more so if one group is dominant 
politically or economically. While civil society should be strong enough 
to prevent the monopolisation of truth by the state, it should not deter the 
state from “fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator 
between major interests” (Gellner, 1996: 5). On that account, the state 
can facilitate and promote the conditions necessary for the evolution of a 
civic community, and a scaling up of broad-based horizontal networks of 
trust and reciprocity.        
 
 
OVERVIEW OF ETHNIC RELATIONS IN MALAYSIA 
 
The state of ethnic relations in Malaysia is, depending on your premise, 
can be categorised somewhere in between stable existence and crisis. It 
therefore come as no surprise that an alarmist would paint a bleak 
picture of a continuous state of ethnic tensions whereby the country is Azeem Fazwan Ahmad Farouk & Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar 
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almost always on a brink of an impending ethnic conflict. Following this 
line of thought, a Malaysian specialist has remarked that conflict in the 
country is managed through “coercive consociationalism” (Mauzy 1993: 
106). For those who adhered to this school of thought, it is immaterial 
that, in historical terms, “plurality” has characterised Southeast Asia 
even before the arrival of the Europeans. Nonetheless, we have to 
caution that in spite of their long-standing contact and relationship, 
spanning a period of more than a hundred years, the Malays and the non-
Malays have not interacted much. Compounded with that is the British, 
who was largely responsible for bringing in the Chinese and Indian 
immigrants, had long sown the seeds of ethnic conflict through its 
divide-and-rule policy. While the situation in Malaysia is not as bad as 
that of in Sri Lanka or Rwanda, the repercussion of the colonial policy 
had inadvertently accentuated ethnic prejudices. As Mohamad Abu 
Bakar (2001) has noted, the colonial practices, undergirded by a racial 
ideology of innate or inherent differences, had caused the preservation 
and institutionalisation of perceived differences among the races.  
 
Malay nationalist struggle and subsequent formation of ethnic based 
political parties had not only nurtured ethnic awareness among 
Malaysians of different racial origins but also minimised inter-ethnic 
interactions. Incidences of racial clashes had occurred immediately after 
World War II, and the most severed took place in May of 1969. The 
Malay dominated government responded to the latter crisis by 
introducing a two pronged affirmative action policy — eradicating 
poverty and restructuring society to achieve inter-ethnic parity, thus 
promoting national unity. Some segment of the population especially 
that of the Malaysian Chinese, are of the view that the aforementioned 
policy, popularly known as the New Economic Policy (NEP) has the 
revered effect of promoting national disunity as the measures taken were 
highly in favour of the Malays who lagged behind economically. Some 
of the mechanisms used to achieve the aims of the NEP were improving 
the access of the poor to training, capital and land; changing education 
and employment patterns among the Malays through the introduction of 
ethnic quotas favouring the Malays for entry into tertiary institutions; 
requiring companies to restructure their corporate holdings to ensure at 
least 30% Bumiputera (sons of soil) ownership; and allotting publicly 
listed shares at par value or with only nominal premiums to Bumiputera. 
While Malaysia is still struggling to find the right solution to promote 
inter-ethnic unity, “some observers believe that in pure statistical terms, State-Induced Social Capital and Ethnic Integration 
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there have been more ethnic clashes in Britain, Germany, and France in 
the last five years than in the last 45 years of Malaysian post-war 
history” (Shamsul, 2005: 5). Malaysia therefore has been rightly 
described as a country that has always been “in a state of stable tension” 
(Shamsul, 2005: 5). 
 
That the state has been active in promoting ethnic integration is a well 
known fact. While few studies have been done to gauge the 
effectiveness of Malaysia’s National Integration Policy programs, it does 
not alter the fact that the state has taken steps to promote national unity. 
Malaysia’s second premier, Tun Abdul Razak, for example had 
advocated participation in voluntary associations in order to encourage 
integration (Straits Times, 10 October 1969). Nevertheless, voluntary 
associations in Malaysia are still drawn along ethnic lines and current 
trends have shown that this pattern is likely to persist (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Registration Under the Societies Act 1966. 
 
 National  State  Total 
Religious 7,  203  1,400  8,603 
Social welfare  5,629  1,533  7,162 
Social/Recreational 6,158  567  6,725 
Women 372  1,142  1,514 
Culture 1,716  1,428  3,144 
Mutual benefit  2,121  8  2, 129 
Trade 3,360  767  4,  127 
Sport 3,226  3,79  3,605 
Youth 3,157  6,421  9,578 
Educational 367  171  538 
Political 46  51,129  51,175 
Employment 1,104  515  1,619 
General 7,100  2,247  9,347 
Total 41,559  67,707  109,266 
 
Source: New Straits Times,  26 September 2007. 
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CASE STUDY OF RUKUN TETANGGA IN PENANG, MALAYSIA 
 
This section provides the empirical evidence to support our claim that 
the state can indeed play a role in generating bridging social capital. In 
the Malaysian context, the state, through the National Unity and 
Integration Department, which is under the jurisdiction of the Prime 
Minister’s Department, has been active in organising communities at the 
local level. This neighbourhood associations, known as Rukun Tetangga 
(RT) are “semi-autonomous” in that while they are set up by the state, 
they are none the less given a free hand in running their day-to-day 
affairs. While some scholars may argue that the RTs are no different 
from GRINGOs (government run/initiated NGOs which act as conduits 
for government and aid funds), we would like to stress that the main 
thrust of these associations is to promote goodwill and understanding 
among the different ethnic groups in the country. In what follows, we 
provide a detail case study of the kind of activities undertaken by RTs in 
Penang which can generate bridging social capital.    
 
The RT was introduced in August of 1975, under the Essential (Rukun 
Tetangga) Regulation 1975, (P.U (A) (279/75). Through this scheme, 
the state’s aim was to promote unity and harmony among the population 
in the residential areas by encouraging face-to-face interaction which, in 
its turn, could foster a spirit of co-operation in the community. The focus 
and orientation of the RT therefore is to build “trust” among the 
different ethnic groups. This objective is implemented through the 
establishment of RT committee at the local level (Figure 2).  
 
In Penang, the number of RT areas has increased from 107 in 1996, to 
237 in 2006.  Every RT is headed by a committee, and its members are 
selected among local residents. The committee acts as a voluntary body 
that plans and organises neighbourhood and goodwill activities
2. Here 
                                                 
2  As a mechanism in managing the ethnic relation, RT committee is responsible 
to: 
a)    Carry out welfare, recreational, educational and security activities for 
everyone’s benefit. 
b)   Understand and identify the problem and the need of the local people and 
try to find a solution. 
c)   Bring up the problem that can’t be solved to the party concerned 
according to the issues.  State-Induced Social Capital and Ethnic Integration 
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we will review some the activities that were organised by the RT which 
have the potential to generate bridging social capital.  
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Management Structure of the Rukun Tetangga. 
 
Rukun Tetangga’s Activity 
 
The RT has been given the primary task of implementing programs that 
are formulated by the National Unity and Integration Department. As 
mentioned before, the main aim of the RT is to encourage inter-ethnic 
interaction at the local level. These tasks are carried out through various 
social development activities such as recreation, education, sports, 
environment, economy and religion. Table 2 shows the RT’s overall 
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activity in Penang according to sectors, and Table 3 shows the number 
of participants according to ethnic group. Up to December 2006, a total 
of 18,139 activities had been carried out. This involves 902,121 people 
of whom 382,947 were Malays, 385,826 were Chinese, 111,050 were 
Indians and 411 were from other races. From the activities mentioned, 
we will look briefly at some of the activities that were organised by the 
RT. 
 
Table 2:  Implementation of RT’s Inter-ethnic Activities in Penang According 
to Sector.  
 
Field Activities  Number of Activities  
(2006) 
Sport 1596 
Recreational 4286 
Social 947 
Welfare 523 
Culture 611 
Education 3199 
Security 2877 
Health and Environment  1816 
Economy 570 
Religion 1710 
Others 4 
Total 18,139 
 
 Source: Department of National Unity, Penang 2006. 
 
 
Table 3:  Participants According to Ethnic Group. 
 
Ethnic Group  Number of participation (1997) 
Malay 382,947 
Chinese 385,826 
Indian 111,050 
Others 411 
Total 902,121 
 
Source: Department of National Unity, Penang 2006. 
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Religious Festivals Celebration 
 
A variety of festivals which reflect the country’s multi-religious 
character indirectly/directly have served as a mechanism to foster a spirit 
of co-operation, tolerance and goodwill. Each festival provides an 
opportunity for different ethnic groups to strengthen their co-operation 
and relationships. During each festival, it is very common for most 
Malaysians regardless of their ethnic background to hold “open house” 
for their relatives as well as friends of various ethnicities.  
 
          For the Muslims, the three most important religious festivals 
are Eid ul-fitri (Hari Raya Puasa), which  concludes a month 
of daily fasting during the month of Ramadhan;  Eid ul-
Adha (Hari Raya Haji) celebrated on the 10th day of the 
12th moon in the Muslim calendar when Muslims perform 
the last phase of the Haj (pilgrimage) to the holy city of 
Mecca; and the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (Maulid 
ul-Rasul) which falls on the 12th day of the 3rd moon in the 
Muslim calendar. Malaysians of Chinese descendence 
celebrate Chinese New Year on the first day of the Chinese 
lunar calendar which falls in January or February every year. 
Another Chinese festival is the Moon Cake Festival  which 
falls on the 15th day of the 8th Chinese lunar month 
(normally September). As regards to Hinduism, in the month 
of Aippasi (October-November), Hindus celebrate Deepavali 
(or Festival of Lights). This is to celebrate the triumph of 
good over evil and the light over darkness. Another most 
important Hindu festival is Thaipusam which falls in 
January. This is the festival to commemorate the birthday of 
Lord Subramaniam. On December 25, as well as in other 
parts of the world, Christians in Malaysia celebrate 
Christmas, the birth of Jesus Christ. Buddhists in Malaysia 
celebrate  Wesak Day, the birthday of Lord Buddha. The 
Buddhists subsist on a vegetarian diet for the day.
3 
 
                                                 
3  For details of these festivals, see; The Government of Malaysia, Official Year 
Book 1994, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; also, The Government of Malaysia, 
Negara, The Department of National Unity, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1990, Kuala 
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In the case of the RT associations, each festival would be celebrated in 
the form of gotong-royong  (voluntary co-operation) which would be 
held in the Balai Rakyat (community hall) or pondok Rukun Tetangga 
(Rukun Tetangga Hall). These kinds of activities have become a routine 
event for most of the Rukun Tetangga organisations.
4 The primary 
objective of these activities is to encourage residents from the various 
ethnic backgrounds to interact.
5 It is hoped that inter-group interaction 
would have a positive socialisation effects.  
 
Unity Telematch 
 
This activity is a type of recreational sports that is quite popular among 
Malaysians, and was therefore identified as one of the methods used by 
the RT committee to form a harmonious society. Three elements have 
been incorporated into the telematch: 
 
a)   Ensuring that all committee members are aware that tolerance and 
cooperation are important elements in achieving success. 
b)   Give an opportunity to people across all levels of society to interact 
and to engage in face-to-face interaction. 
c)   Reduction of feelings of ethnocentrism.
6 
 
 Since the objective of this program is to utilise sports as a mechanism to 
promote unity among the different ethnic groups, the events in the tele-
match were deliberately designed so as to inculcate the spirit of 
cooperation.  The main objective of the telematch is, however, still inter-
ethnic participation.   
 
Goodwill /Cross-community Trips    
 
Cross-community goodwill trips between one RT sector to another is 
one of the programs formulated to enhance inter-ethnic interaction. The 
rationale of having the goodwill trip/cross-community trip is to expose 
                                                 
4  Government of Malaysia, 1994 Annual Report, The Department of National 
Unity, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  
5  The Government of Malaysia, Program and Activities of the Neighbourhood 
Consensus Movement, op.cit, p. 28. 
6  Report of the unity telematch program, Department of National Unity Penang, 
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the multi-ethnic society to multiculturalism. Through this trip, the 
participants would be exposed to various cultural practices of the various 
ethnic groups in the country. Here, inter-ethnic face-to-face interaction is 
likely to enhance greater understanding within and between the 
communities.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organisation, such as 
trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1995). This definition 
includes three conceptually different aspects of social capital–norms, 
networks, and consequences. The advantage of the definition is that it 
combines three aspects of social capital in an interesting and provocative 
way; the disadvantage is that it runs different concepts together that 
should be separated. Here we call into questions the assumption that the 
level of social capital is path-dependent. In a multi-ethnic society, 
political structure and political context are critically important and can 
go a long way toward shaping both the kinds of organisations 
represented in society and their impact on the behaviour and attitudes of 
citizens. We argue that the generation of social capital is context 
dependent and that the state is also a source of social capital. In other 
words, the level of social capital can be altered through induced 
structural change. While social capital exists in all societies–be it 
homogenous or plural societies, empirical evidence has pointed out that 
social capital of the bonding kind is the most prevalent in either a 
homogenous or a plural society. Put in a different way, people who are 
alike, for expressive reasons, tend to interact with others who are like 
themselves. Bonding social capital therefore has an inverse relationship 
to ethnic integration. Even though the state has the ability to induce 
people of different ethnicity to interact and thus generate bridging social 
capital, the prevalence of ethnic enclaves in Penang has somewhat 
diluted the effectiveness of the RT. This is due to the fact that ethnic 
integration and bridging social may only flourish in a mix 
neighbourhood. The central argument in this study is that the state has 
the ability to provide an infrastructure for people from different 
background to interact and a by-product of this interaction is bridging 
social capital which will inevitably lead to a higher degree of ethnic 
integration. While the state might not have total autonomy from societal Azeem Fazwan Ahmad Farouk & Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar 
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forces, state elites might also act independently in carrying out the RT 
programs in that the programs might be a conduit for a social control 
mechanism. This, however, by no means cancels out the fact that the 
state has the capacity to “induce” bridging social capital by co-opting 
social elites from different ethnic groups to interact and the one of the 
trickle down effects is a higher level of ethnic integration. Nevertheless, 
we are not assuming that that every individual or collective actor utilises 
all available social capital or the “use value” of the bridging social 
capital generated by the state. More importantly, while the state can 
induce bridging social capital, the effective use of the resource and the 
program formulated to promote inter-ethnic integration have yet to be 
determined.   
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